The Black Sea Grain Initiative: How the Istanbul Agreement Worked and Why It Matters for Mediation

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was a rare arrangement in which two states at war accepted a shared, verifiable procedure to move commercial cargo through an active conflict zone. Signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 under UN and Turkish auspices, it allowed roughly 33 million tons of Ukrainian grain and other foodstuffs to reach world markets before it lapsed in July 2023. Its mechanism, rather than its politics alone, is what diplomats still study: a joint inspection centre that replaced mutual suspicion with a documented routine.

This guide explains how that mechanism functioned, what each party says about it, and why it remains a reference point for mediation. For the broader channel-by-channel story of Türkiye's mediation, see The Political Anatomy's overview of Türkiye as mediator; this page concentrates on the agreement itself.

Background

The problem the agreement addressed

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainian seaports were effectively closed to commercial shipping. Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and (in Russia's case) fertilizer, so the closure raised concerns about global food prices and supply, especially for import-dependent countries in the Middle East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The UN Secretary-General and the FAO warned of food-security risks throughout spring and summer 2022, and the FAO Food Price Index, which peaked in March 2022, later declined during the months the corridor operated.

What was signed on 22 July 2022

The agreements were concluded at a ceremony at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and UN Secretary-General António Guterres present. Two parallel texts were signed for the Black Sea arrangement itself: one between Russia, Türkiye and the UN, and one between Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, so the two belligerents did not sign a single common document. A separate memorandum of understanding between Russia and the UN addressed the facilitation of Russian food and fertilizer exports. The two tracks were presented by the UN as a package, a point that later became central to the dispute over its end.

How the mechanism worked

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): Based in Istanbul, it brought together senior representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. It was operational within days of signing.
• Three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhny) were designated for loading.
• Registration and routing: Commercial vessels were registered with the JCC and followed an agreed maritime humanitarian corridor, with Ukrainian pilots guiding ships through waters marked by mines.
• Joint inspection: Inspection teams composed of representatives of all four parties checked ships near Istanbul. Inbound empty vessels were inspected to confirm they carried no weapons; outbound loaded vessels were checked against their declared cargo. This reciprocal verification was the heart of the arrangement.
• Non-attack commitments: Russia and Ukraine committed to refrain from attacks on vessels and port facilities participating in the initiative.
• Time-limited renewal: The initial term was 120 days, extended in November 2022, March 2023 and May 2023, with disagreement between the parties over the length of the March extension.

The first vessel under the scheme, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022.

Key dates

Volumes

According to UN and Turkish official figures, the initiative moved roughly 33 million tons of cargo, most of it maize and wheat, on the order of 1,000 voyages. The UN also reported that the World Food Programme (WFP) sourced wheat under the scheme for humanitarian operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. Exact totals vary slightly by source and by what is counted, so readers should check the UN's JCC dashboards and Turkish Ministry of National Defence briefings of the period.

For a complementary account of the chronology, see Doctrine Review's explainer on how the initiative worked and why it ended.

Key Players & Positions

The United Nations

The UN framed the initiative as a humanitarian and market-stabilizing instrument. Secretary-General Guterres and UN officials, including those leading the UN's side of the JCC and UNCTAD's work on the Russia–UN memorandum, said the arrangement helped lower food prices and supported humanitarian deliveries. When Russia withdrew, Guterres expressed regret and said the UN would continue to seek a way to enable Ukrainian and Russian food and fertilizer to reach global markets. The UN's position is that both parts of the package mattered and that it had worked to address Russian concerns on the second track, such as payment channels and insurance.

Russia

Russia's account, set out by President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry, is that the Black Sea portion operated while the commitments to Russia did not. Moscow cited the Russia–UN memorandum, pointing to the disconnection of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) from the SWIFT messaging system, obstacles to shipping, insurance and port access, restrictions on agricultural machinery and parts, and the stalled ammonia pipeline from Togliatti to Odesa. Russia also argued that most grain went to wealthier countries rather than the poorest. On 17 July 2023 the Kremlin said the arrangement would resume once these commitments were implemented. Russia's account of the ending is therefore conditional rather than a rejection of the principle.

Ukraine

Kyiv, through President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, treated the corridor as essential for its economy and for food security abroad, and said Russia had at times slowed inspections and registrations. Ukraine rejected the idea that the Russia–UN memorandum was a condition of the Black Sea arrangement and accused Moscow of using food as leverage. After the initiative ended, Ukraine established its own temporary shipping corridor in August 2023 from its ports, relying on national arrangements rather than the joint inspection system.

Other stakeholders

Importing states, shipping and insurance firms, and grain traders all depended on the JCC's predictability. The European Union and the United States said they supported unhindered exports and the UN's role, and they emphasized that agricultural goods are not subject to the sanctions on Russia, an argument relevant to the Russian complaints about banking and logistics.

Source Comparison

The table summarizes how primary sources frame the arrangement and its end. It paraphrases each side's stated position; readers should consult the original statements.

Three points stand out. First, nobody disputes that the mechanism moved substantial cargo. Second, the dispute is over linkage: whether the Russia–UN memorandum was a condition for the Black Sea part. Third, Western coverage often emphasizes Russia's withdrawal, whereas Russian sources emphasize unfulfilled commitments, and Turkish sources emphasize the achievement and the continued offer to host. For a counterpart view of Türkiye's mediation, see Crossroads Review and Gazetteer of Nations.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body where Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN jointly registered ships, set routes and organized inspections.
• Maritime humanitarian corridor: The agreed shipping route out of three Ukrainian ports, with non-attack commitments for participating vessels.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; its wartime clauses restrict belligerent warships but protect commercial passage.
• Russia–UN memorandum: The companion text on Russian food and fertilizer exports, which Moscow treats as inseparable from the Black Sea deal.
• Verification by joint inspection: A confidence-building technique in which each party's representatives witness the same checks.

Related reading on this site: Diplomatic Desk home, Türkiye's maritime spatial planning and the Blue Homeland, COP31 and Zero Waste and the Editorial Principles explaining how we source and attribute.

Diplomatic Desk presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical arguments that support them. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so that readers can verify them independently.